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Abstract. Recent perspectival interpretations of Kant suggest a way of relating his 
epistemology to empirical science that makes it plausible to regard Einstein’s 
theory of relativity as having a Kantian grounding. This first of two articles 
exploring this topic focuses on how the foregoing hypothesis accounts for various 
resonances between Kant’s philosophy and Einstein’s science. The great attention 
young Einstein paid to Kant in his early intellectual development demonstrates the 
plausibility of this hypothesis, while certain features of Einstein’s cultural-political 
context account for his reluctance to acknowledge Kant’s influence, even though 
contemporary philosophers who regarded themselves as Kantians urged him to do 
so. The sequel argues that this Kantian grounding probably had a formative 
influence not only on Einstein’s discovery of the theory of relativity and his view 
of the nature of science, but also on his quasi-mystical, religious disposition. 
 
1. Kant’s System of Perspectives as the Grounding for Modern 
Scientific Revolutions 
 
In the course of defending Albert Einstein’s revolutionary approach to 
physics, and perhaps also as an implicit affirmation of Einstein’s religious 
worldview, Sir Arthur Eddington boldly asserted: “There are absolute things 
in the world but you must look deeply for them” (Eddington, 1928/1935, p. 
34). What are these “absolute things,” in terms of Einstein’s theory of 
relativity? Are they explicable or necessarily mysterious? Moreover, what 
led young Einstein to his revolutionary convictions regarding these deep 
absolutes that govern the natural world? The suggestion that Einstein’s 
worldview was essentially Kantian might seem unwarranted for two reasons. 
First, Kant is often regarded more as an enemy of the metaphysical belief in 
“deep absolutes” and of quasi-religious appeals to mystery (whether physical 
or theological) than as a philosopher who might engender such convictions. 
Second, Einstein himself tended to downplay Kant’s relevance to his own 
thinking; if some of the deepest convictions informing his worldview appear 
to be grounded in Kant’s philosophy, we must explain why Einstein did not 
46                                                 Stephen Palmquist 
adequately acknowledge this resonance. 
Despite these initial misgivings, I shall argue in this first of two essays on 
this topic that Einstein’s early reading of Kant’s philosophy, though often 
overlooked or trivialized, provides a likely explanation for Einstein’s 
adoption of the worldview (as epitomized by Eddington’s statement) that 
enabled him to discover the theory of relativity. Kant’s philosophy, with its 
“Critical” method,1 establishes a worldview whereby religion and science can 
coexist. What I have elsewhere called his “Critical mysticism”2 is only quasi-
mystical, inasmuch as the qualification “Critical” requires anything we say 
about the mystery of the unknown (the “thing in itself”) to be constrained 
and circumscribed by what is known. If we take into account the delicate 
balance between the knowable and the unknowable in Kant’s philosophy, we 
may find that the modern revolutions in science that challenge the classical 
theories (such as Euclidean geometry and Newtonian physics) are each 
rooted in Kant’s philosophy. With this possibility in mind, I shall examine 
various resonances between Kant and Einstein, the first and foremost being 
that both acknowledge a basic mystery underlying nature, yet clearly 
distinguish between the scientific disposition that employs language to 
construct empirical knowledge of nature (this being the focus of the present 
article) and the religious disposition that contemplates and appreciates this 
mystery as it is in itself (an issue addressed in Part II. Although they employ 
different terms, both Kant and Einstein acknowledge that the constructs of 
language cannot adequately express the deep absolutes that ultimately 
ground both scientific knowledge and religious experience. 
Kant introduces his revolutionary “Copernican” Perspective in the second 
edition Preface to the first Critique, where he argues that “we can know a 
priori of things only what we ourselves put into them” (Kant, 1929a, xviii).3 
(When using “Perspective” to refer to the way of thinking that governs 
Kant’s entire philosophical System, I capitalize the “P.” This distinguishes it 
from the four perspectives [small “p”]–the transcendental, logical, empirical, 
                                               
 
1 For an account of Kant’s Critical method of reasoning, see my (1993, Chap. 
II).  
2 See “Kant’s Perspectival Foundation for Critical Mysticism,” Part Four of my 
(2000). 
3 References cite the second (1787) edition, except that those prefaced with 
“A” are unique to the first (1781) edition. For an explanation of the “perspectival 
equivalents” in Kant’s text (i.e., the terms that have essentially the same meaning 
as the word “perspective,” which in Kant’s day was not yet used in its modern 
sense), see (1993, pp. 39-55).  
The Kantian Grounding of Einstein’s Worldview  (Part I)              47 
and hypothetical–that operate within his three Critical systems. 4 ) To 
illustrate this, he refers to the “intellectual [Denkart] revolution” in 
mathematics, to the “revolution in its point of view [Denkart]” in physics, 
and to the “new method of thought [Denkungsart]” in his own philosophical 
system.5 Such passages reveal Kant’s awareness of the deep methodological 
connection between scientific and philosophical revolutions. Although in the 
ordinary world of everyday experience our knowledge must conform to the 
objects that present themselves to us, we can properly answer philosophical 
(especially epistemological) questions about that world only by making the 
opposite (Copernican or “Transcendental”) assumption: to understand the 
philosophical foundations of knowledge, we must assume that the objects of 
knowledge conform to (i.e., are themselves shaped by) the mental powers of 
the knowing subject. Kant defends this hypothesis with numerous arguments. 
As with all perspectival revolutions, the best proof is how effectively it helps 
us solve philosophical, scientific, and religious problems; the more insights a 
paradigm shift provides for philosophy, science, and religion, the more we 
can trust its adequacy and regard it as a reliable starting-point for empirical 
understanding in general (i.e., the more effectively it functions as a 
“worldview”). 
My hypothesis is that the scientific revolutions since Kant’s day, far from 
disproving the legitimacy of Kant’s epistemology and philosophy of science 
(as commentators so often assume), can be interpreted as applications of his 
philosophical worldview to geometry, arithmetic, logic, physics, quantum 
mechanics, cosmology, biology, psychology, medicine, etc. 6  The most 
obvious objection to this hypothesis is that Kant presupposes the legitimacy 
of an entirely classical worldview, supported by Euclidean geometry, 
Aristotelian logic, and Newtonian physics. Commentators typically assume 
Kant had a naive trust in the absolute validity of these (then virtually 
unchallenged) scientific theories–a trust that has been proved wrong many 
times over (so the objector assumes) by the radical revolutions in these and 
                                               
 
4 I explain these and other interpretive conventions more fully in (1993, pp. 
55-65). 
5 Kant, 1929, xi, xiii, xviii. For a detailed discussion of Kant’s Copernican 
hypothesis, including a selection of typical descriptions by various scholars, see 
(1993, pp. 67-69). 
6 For examples of how the perspectival interpretation of Kant enables us to 
appreciate the deep consistency between Kantian philosophy and the post-Kantian 
scientific revolutions, see my articles, (1990) and (2002). My fuller demonstration 
of Kant’s influence on the other sciences named here comes in Kant’s Critical 
Science (in process). 
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other sciences since Kant’s day. Miller is typical of those who think Kant’s 
portrayal of space and time as pure intuitions simply “elevated Newton’s 
notions of absolute space and time” to a new level of certainty; he does not 
realize that in so doing, Kant also effected a radical revolution in how we 
conceive of space and time themselves (Miller, 1982; see also Fölsing, 1997; 
Overbye, 2000). 
This standard interpretation can hardly be the whole story, because Kant 
himself challenges each classical scientific theory in several respects, even 
though he accepts that each had produced undeniably significant empirical 
results. His goal is not to justify each theory because it and no alternative 
must be deemed forever correct, but to explain how such impressive results 
could be attained by any scientific theory. If Kant’s philosophical account of 
the nature of scientific knowledge correctly grounded the sciences of his day, 
then it will be just as correct for the sciences of our day–the latter being 
subject to revision just as the classical theories were. Moreover, Kant’s 
reference to several past scientific revolutions in the first Critique’s second 
Preface suggests that he expected the new grounding provided by his 
Copernican revolution in philosophy to have a reforming effect on the exact 
sciences.  
For our present concerns the most important example is that, although 
Kant accepts the basic tenets of Newton’s laws of physics as empirically 
established principles, he rejects as untenable the philosophical worldview 
Newton assumes as its background: that space has an absolute, self-
sufficient reality that we can distinguish both from ourselves and from the 
reality of an equally absolute time. In direct opposition to this philosophical 
position, called “transcendental realism,” Kant defends a two-sided theory 
called both “transcendental idealism” and “empirical realism.” According to 
Kant, both space and time must be viewed, from the transcendental 
perspective, as “forms of intuition” that our mind imposes onto the world. 
All objects of human knowledge must present themselves in spatio-temporal 
form, he argues, because viewed from the transcendental perspective, we 
impose this form onto empirical objects.7 The transcendental conditions are 
                                               
 
7  In his attempt to portray Einstein’s worldview as superior to Kant’s, 
Morrison interprets the idealist strain in Kant’s theory of nature as if it amounts 
to a Berkeleyan idealism (Morrison, 1987, p. 53), whereby we end up “not 
hav[ing] an objective system of nature with invariant laws because the forms and 
categories do not exist independent of the human mind.” But few (if any) serious 
Kant-scholars nowadays think Kant’s transcendental philosophy requires such a 
radically non-realist interpretation. The transcendental conditions, according to 
Kant, are what make the empirical world real and assure us of its independent 
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precisely what enable us observers to regard objects in space and time as 
independently real from the empirical perspective. 
This drastic revision of the Newtonian worldview, of his philosophy of 
space and time as absolute “containers” for objects of knowledge, paved the 
way for many of the great scientific revolutions we have witnessed during the 
past two centuries. For Kant’s new background theory leads to a result never 
contemplated by Newton: if we regard them as they are in themselves, the 
objects we must perceive as being in a certain kind of time and space are 
released from transcendental necessities such as Euclidean geometry; 
constructing a geometry of space or a physical (mechanistic) theory of 
spatial objects that is not bound by the perceptual limitations we impose onto 
our observations then becomes a contingent matter, the discovery of whose 
exact nature is the scientist’s never-ending task.8 In the remainder of this 
article I shall demonstrate that Einstein knew about Kant’s revolutionary 
philosophy and argue that it provided just such a transcendental grounding 
for his revolutionary scientific theories. 
 
2. The Controversial Resonance between Kant and Einstein 
 
That Kant-scholars themselves often overlook the grounding Kant’s 
philosophy provided for modern scientific revolutions, perhaps because Kant 
did not explicitly predict the profound impact his paradigm shift in 
philosophy would have on empirical science, partially explains why 
commentators on Einstein also tend to neglect the Kantian grounding of his 
worldview. For instance, one popularizer of modern physics, oblivious to any 
resonance between Einstein and Kant, naively claims: “It took an Einstein to 
make scientists and philosophers realize that geometry is not inherent in 
nature, but is imposed upon it by the mind” (Capra, 1975/1983—emphasis 
added). Weinert acknowledges the resonance, but overlooks the subtlety of 
Kant’s view of geometry when he writes: “Einstein is a Kantian in the 
outlines of his philosophy, but not in the details of his physics” (Weinert, 
2005, p. 585).9 Of course, Kant did not foresee relativity physics; but the 
                                                                                           
 
(objective) existence. 
8 I defend this interpretation of Kant’s theory of geometry in (1990). 
9  Insofar as Kant took his views on physics mostly from the received 
(Newtonian) views of his day, the second part of Weinert’s statement need not be 
regarded as evidence against the thesis I am defending here. As a scientist, of 
course, Einstein worked out his understanding of concepts such as causality in a 
far more technical way than Kant (who was concerned with causality as a 
philosophical principle) would ever have needed to do. Thus, Einstein treated 
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latter is not inconsistent with Kant’s philosophical grounding for science. By 
defending a new worldview, bearing striking resemblances to the one 
Einstein adopts, Kant prepared the way for the non-Euclidean geometries 
that were already well developed by Einstein’s youth.10 
Ilse Schneider, a philosophy student fortunate enough to travel with 
Einstein on numerous train trips to and from university, was working at the 
time on “the relation of [Einstein’s] theories to philosophy and, in particular, 
to the philosophy of Kant.” She refers to the typical claim “that Einstein’s 
theories had ‘refuted’ Newton’s and that therefore Kant’s ideas of space and 
time were refuted too” as being a grossly “superficial judgement” (Schneider, 
1980, p. 522). She frequently discussed with Einstein “Spinoza’s 
metaphysics…as well as the epistemology of Hume or Kant.” In one such 
discussion, “concerning Kant’s views on the general universal laws of nature 
in their relation to geometry–which, by the way, are very similar to 
Einstein’s” (Schneider, 1980, p. 522), he reportedly offered the following, 
humorous metaphor: 
 
Kant is a sort of highway with lots and lots of milestones. Then all the little dogs 
turn up and each deposits its contribution at the milestones.” Pretending to feel 
indignation I said: “But, what a comparison!” With his loud, boyish laughter, he 
remarked: “But what will you have? Your Kant is the highway after all, and that is 
there to stay. (Schneider, 1980, p. 522)11 
                                                                                           
 
causality in wholly functional terms, associated with the use of differential 
equations. As we shall see in Part II (§3), the fact that he knew how to apply this 
philosophical principle to empirical science in ways that would have left Kant’s 
head spinning does not mean Einstein actually rejected, in practice, the role of 
Kantian causality as a transcendental principle. 
10  Jammer points out an interesting correspondence between Kant’s and 
Einstein’s views of geometry, when he notes that Kant “anticipated Hermann 
Minkowski’s geometrical representation of relativistic space-time. ‘If time is 
represented,’ wrote Kant, ‘by an infinitely long straight line and all simultaneous 
occurrences at a given moment are represented by a transversely drawn straight 
line through that point on the time line, the thus generated surface represents the 
phenomenal world with respect both to its substance and its accidents.’” (Jammer, 
1999, quoting from Kant’s Inaugural Dissertation, De mundi sensibilis atque 
intelligibilis forma et principiis). 
11 Klaus Hentschel casts doubt on Rosenthal-Schneider’s claims in (1992, pp. 
593-624), claiming they were a consciously fabricated story intended to portray 
Einstein in a Kantian light even though Einstein at that time had a quite different 
attitude towards the philosophical implications of his empirical science. However, 
the passage quoted here hardly portrays Einstein in a Kantian light, so even if it is 
not authentic, we may regard it as a piece of instructive fiction. The “dogs” are an 
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After finishing her dissertation, Schneider published it in 1921 as Das Zaum-
Zeit-Problem bei Kant und Einstein–an interpretation Einstein once referred 
to as the “relativized Kant” (Einstein, 2004, p. 244). 12  In contrast to 
Schneider’s opinion, Einstein once said: “I do not think my [relativity] theory 
accords with the thought of Kant, that is, with what that thought appears to 
me to be” (quoted in Pais, 1994, p. 123). The sole evidence he cites when 
making such comments is that “Kant’s apriorism” and “Poincare’s 
conventionalism” are “opposite points of view” (Pais, 1994, p. 123). As I 
shall argue in §2 of Part II, however, these two views of science need not be 
contradictory, inasmuch as Kant’s philosophy makes room for both, applied 
in different ways. 
Kant argues that Euclidean geometry’s necessary and universal character 
derives not from any empirical connection between objects but from the 
subjective constitution of our perceptual capacity. This is compatible with 
Einstein’s view of geometry: both distinguish between the geometry that can 
be described (or pictured)–in its purest form, Euclidean geometry–and the 
actual (yet ultimately imperceptible) geometry underlying the empirical 
world. Kant insists that the latter (probably one of Eddington’s “absolutes”), 
insofar as we regard the world as a thing in itself, is unknowable; Einstein is 
equally insistent that the scientist’s theories about this world–geometrical 
and otherwise–remain hypothetical and ultimately approximate. Einstein 
therefore confirms Kant’s basic insight, that insofar as science is to be 
necessary and universal, it must be grounded in transcendental principles, 
whereas once it becomes genuinely empirical, it loses this quality and 
becomes tentative and ever-changing.  
Einstein focused on the empirical side of this equation because, as von 
Weizsäcker plainly declares, “Einstein was a physicist and not a 
philosopher” (Weizsäcker, 1979, p. 160) He later adds: “Neither does he 
show contempt for philosophy; philosophical questioning is essential to him” 
(Weizsäcker, 1979, p. 160). Thus, in a letter to Kant-scholar Hans 
Vaihinger, dated 3 May 1919, Einstein politely refuses Vaihinger’s offer to 
publish a paper of Einstein’s in Kant-Studien, saying: “I am too little versed 
                                                                                           
 
apt metaphor for Einstein’s disparaging view of neo-Kantian and logical empiricist 
(positivist) philosophers who, as we shall see in §§3-4, were vying for Einstein’s 
support, while the “highway” represents Einstein’s own youthful experience of the 
Kant who grounded his worldview. 
12  Here, and for all volumes of this work, references cite the document 
number; but page number(s) are used to cite editors’ notes included only in the 
German edition. 
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in philosophy to take an active part in it myself; if I can be passively 
receptive to the work of the men in this field, I am content enough” (Einstein, 
2004, p. 33). He says his only “service to philosophy” is “to pass on 
information…about matters regarding my specialty.” Such comments 
demonstrate that Einstein was open to being influenced by philosophers such 
as Kant yet did not see himself as having philosophical expertise.  
Einstein’s friend, Abraham Pais, detected a more nuanced attitude toward 
philosophy and science: “it would be more fitting to call Einstein a natural 
philosopher than a scientist” (Pais, 1994, p. 123). While he admits Einstein 
even “at his best” was not “a philosopher in the academic sense of the term” 
and that “he did not consider himself a philosopher,” Pais emphasizes “that 
his impact on philosophy was profound” (Pais, 1994, p. 123). Ignoring 
Einstein’s self-confessed openness to philosophy, Pais boldly proclaims: “It 
is also certain that his best work was not influenced by any conventional 
philosophical system” (Pais, 1994, p. 123). As we shall see in §§2-3 of Part 
II, Einstein did reject Kant’s claim that transcendental principles such as 
causality are synthetic a priori, perhaps in part because his expertise as a 
physicist led him, quite rightly, to adopt a bias toward the empirical. I shall 
argue, however, that what Einstein rejects is not synthetic apriority as such, 
but the relevance of applying this transcendental perspective to scientific 
observation–a point that does not contradict a perspectival interpretation of 
Kant. A Kantian can agree with Einstein’s comparison of “Kant’s celebrated 
view of time” to “Andersen’s fairy tale of the emperor’s new clothes” 
(Einstein, 2004, p. 104), for however meaningful synthetic apriority may be 
for transcendental philosophers, it does not enter, as such, into the empirical 
process of scientific research. Kant affirms essentially the same view of the 
exclusively philosophical relevance of synthetic apriority (see Palmquist, 
1987a, pp. 3-22; 1987b, pp. 255-282). 
In arguing that Einstein was not significantly influenced by Kant, 
Morisson lists six key points of contact between them. Ironically, on the first 
three points, Morisson admits that Einstein fully agrees with Kant’s 
underlying assumptions about science: 
 
(1) Einstein retains from Kant the indispensability of the distinction between 
objective and subjective reality. (2) He shares the notion that all knowledge depends 
upon and is limited by experience. (3) Like Kant, Einstein employs…[a procedure 
that] contains features of rationalism and of extreme empirical orientation. 
(Morrison, 1987, p. 51) 
 
Morrison’s fourth point is that, while accepting the relevance of Kant’s 
transcendental principles (e.g., causality), Einstein (following various 
contemporary philosophers) treats these “as free inventions of the scientific 
imagination” (Morrison, 1987, p. 51). We shall see in Part II (§2) that this is 
a direct application for science of Kant’s theory of the regulative 
employment of the ideas of reason and does not require (as Einstein 
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admittedly believed) the abandonment of the a priori for philosophy. Fifth, 
like Kant, Einstein had a variety of “moral, theological, and epistemic 
expectations,” but was “less ambitious” than Kant concerning these 
(Morrison, 1987, p. 51)–as we would expect for someone who was, at best, 
an amateur philosopher. Finally, Einstein rejected Kant’s phenomenal/ 
noumenal distinction, especially his belief that “noumenal causality” gives 
human freedom a means of influencing the empirical world (Morrison, 1987, 
p. 51). 
While Morrison’s summary correctly highlights two areas of 
disagreement between Kant and Einstein (the status of transcendental 
principles and the compatibility of freedom with science), he inadvertently 
confirms the claim I am defending in this pair of articles, that Einstein’s 
worldview had an essentially Kantian grounding. By relating my argument 
primarily to Einstein’s worldview (i.e., to the set of background assumptions 
that guide one’s thinking on almost everything), I am not claiming that Kant 
had a direct influence on the development of Einstein’s specific scientific 
discoveries. That he may have had some minimal influence is a possibility 
we shall consider in §1 of Part II. What we have established up to now is 
only that certain key features of Kant’s worldview seem to have informed 
Einstein’s background assumptions, even though Einstein was not fully 
aware of this resonance–a paradox that calls for some resolution. With the 
foregoing resonances in mind, I shall focus in the remainder of this article on 
Einstein’s intellectual development, in search of evidence that the striking 
similarity between his worldview and Kant’s is more than just coincidental. 
 
3. Kant’s Influence on Einstein’s Early Intellectual Development 
 
Einstein once recalled the “wonder” he “experienced as a child of 4 or 5 
years, when my father showed me a compass.... Something deeply hidden 
had to be behind things” (Einstein, 1949/1969, p. 9). 13  This intuitive 
awareness of an obscure “something” that is revealed in our experience of 
symmetries in nature, yet without allowing itself to be expressed in language, 
                                               
 
13  Einstein states in the first sentence of his landmark paper, “On the 
Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies” (1998, pp. 891-921), that the problem he sets 
out to solve is that Maxwell’s theory “leads to asymmetries that do not seem to be 
inherent in the phenomena.” It therefore seems likely that symmetry was at least 
one aspect of the deeply hidden mystery of nature that fascinated him so much. 
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is akin to Kant’s “thing in itself.” 14  For Kant, the thing in itself is a 
conceptual construct referring to the natural world, with all the conditions 
that allow us to conceptualize or describe what we experience abstracted 
from it. This mysterious reality that must underlie the natural world, if we 
are to escape Berkeleyan idealism, serves as a paradoxical grounding for the 
fundamental assumption of Kant’s worldview, the “Copernican” Perspective 
that generates his new methodology for understanding how scientific 
knowledge arises, through the structuring “compass-points” of the 
categories–these being the forms we must use to understand the symmetries 
we experience (see note 14). 
In light of his childhood experience of the universe’s “deeply hidden” 
forces, young Albert must have been intrigued by this theory of the thing in 
itself, the necessarily hidden (i.e., unknowable) absolute underlying our 
understanding of nature, when he first read Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. 
This momentous event occurred at a surprisingly early stage of Einstein’s 
intellectual development. Max Talmey, a medical student who first met 
Albert (then age ten) in the Fall of 1889 and had lunch at Einstein’s home 
every Thursday over the next five years (Einstein, 1987, p. 371), recalls: “I 
recommended to [young Albert] the reading of Kant. At that time he was still 
a child, only thirteen years old, yet Kant’s works, incomprehensible to 
ordinary mortals, seemed clear to him” (Talney, 1932, p. 164).15 Talmey 
goes on to claim that “Kant became Albert’s favorite philosopher after he 
had read through his Critique of Pure Reason” (Talney, 1932, p. 164). 
Einstein’s interest in this “boyhood hero” (Overbye, 2000, p. 99) was not 
short-lived, for Seelig reports that as a “16-year-old youth [Einstein] 
                                               
 
14 For a thoroughgoing discussion of the nature and meaning of this much-
misunderstood term in Kant’s philosophy, see my (1993, pp. 143-193, 371-394)—
Chapters V-VI and Appendices V-VI. Interestingly, Kant’s table of four categories 
structures the “architectonic logic” of his System in a manner comparable to the 
way the four cardinal directions structure our interpretation of the movements of a 
compass (see Chapter III). 
15 This text is frequently quoted, often without reference. See e.g., Jammer 
(1999, pp. 41-42) and Hoffmann & Dukas, 1972, p. 24). Some name the medical 
student as Max Talmud, this being his birth name. He changed his name, as many 
immigrants did, when he moved to the United States (Pais, 1994, p. 123f). I refer 
to him as Talmey because he used this name when publishing his book. In their 
notes to a bibliography written by Einstein’s sister, the editors of Einstein’s 
Collected Writings note an important corroboration of Talmey’s report (Einstein, 
1987, lxiin [German]): “Einstein’s study of Kant was also recalled by one of his 
Munich schoolmates (Fritz Genewein to Einstein, 23 October 1924).” Fölsing 
(1997, p. 25) gives relevant quotes from both sources. 
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intoxicated himself with Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason” (Seelig, 1956, p. 
14). Einstein’s interest in Kant lasted at least until his early college days: the 
transcript for his studies at Zurich Polytechnic (Eidgenössische Technische 
Hochschule, or “ETH”) shows that he registered for Prof. August Stadler’s 
class, entitled “Die Philosophie I. Kants,” as one of three “Nonobligatory 
subjects” during the second semester of his first year (Einstein, 1987, p. 
28).16 The transcript specifies no grade for the Kant subject, so (like most of 
the classes he registered for) Einstein appears not to have completed the 
requirements. 
Max Jammer, adopting the now commonly accepted view that Kant had 
no significant, lasting influence on Einstein’s intellectual development, cites 
some of the foregoing testimonies, but warns: “if correct at all,” the claim 
that Kant influenced Einstein “could have referred only to the young 
Einstein” (Jammer, 1999, p. 42). Jammer observes that the mature Einstein, 
whenever he waxed philosophical, portrayed himself as rejecting certain 
central theses in Kant’s epistemology, including (most importantly) the 
synthetic a priori status of the categories. Nevertheless, I shall argue in Part 
II (§3) that Einstein’s rejection was primarily a response to mistaken 
interpretations of Kant being adopted by contemporary philosophers. 
Einstein disapproved of positivism, especially in his later years, calling the 
logical empiricists his “opponents” (Weizsäcker, 1979, p. 166) even though 
they had been among the most outspoken proponents of his scientific 
breakthroughs. Both the logical empiricists and the neo-Kantians, who were 
their chief rivals for Einstein’s approval, believed that Kant could provide a 
philosophical grounding for relativity physics only after being cleansed of his 
over-confidence in the necessary validity of the synthetic a priori forms of 
knowledge (see e.g. Einstein, 1998, p. 165).17 When he downplays Kant’s 
                                               
 
16 See also Einstein (1998, p. 347 German edition). For an excellent summary 
of the likely content of Stadler’s Kant class, see Beller (2000, Chap. 4). Beller 
persuasively describes how some of the very points Stadler emphasized in his 
class can be observed operating in the scientific revolution Einstein went on to 
effect. She goes so far as to say (p. 89): “Only by acknowledging Einstein’s debt to 
Kant can we put into proper balance what seem to be contradictory strands in 
Einstein’s epistemological position.” 
17 For a thoroughgoing overview of this crucial period of Einstein’s mature 
development, see Ryckman (2005). Although the logical empiricists 
(Reichenbach, Schlick, Carnap, etc.) won the battle against the neo-Kantians 
(most notably Cassirer, but also similarly-minded writers such as Eddington and 
Weyl), Ryckman argues that the latter, transcendental idealist interpretation of 
Einstein provides the only reliable grounding for empirical realism in the 
philosophy of modern physics. His comprehensive study of this complex and 
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influence and emphasizes that of other past philosophers, we should 
therefore take the mature Einstein to be rejecting the “corrupted” Kant of 
contemporary interpreters, rather than his own private (youthful) 
interpretation of Kant’s philosophy as such. 
Michael Friedman offers a detailed account of how Kant, perhaps as 
much as (if not more than) empiricists such as Mach or Russell, influenced 
the development of positivism in the first quarter of the twentieth century and 
how these early positivists (most of whom acknowledged a debt to Kant), in 
turn, influenced Einstein (Friedman, 1999, pp. 18-25). Interestingly, the 
Marburg neo-Kantian, Ernst Cassirer, was also convinced that Einstein’s 
position was not so much a refutation of Kant’s transcendental philosophy as 
a refinement of it. His book (Cassirer, 1921, pp. 86, 101) is a sustained 
attempt to present the theory of relativity in a Kantian guise: Einstein 
corrects our understanding of how the synthetic a priori forms (especially 
space, time and causality) should be applied to physical space, but does not 
refute the theory. Friedman gives an extended account of the relationship 
between Cassirer and the positivists (Friedman, 2000) 18 and Weinert (2005, 
p. 586) lists publications by several others in the early 1920s who argued 
that Einstein’s principles were consistent with Kant’s. For these physicists: 
“The Special theory seemed to confirm what Kant had claimed: that time 
was a feature of the human mind…. Correct the Kantian view for relativistic 
effects, and Kant becomes vindicated by the Einsteinian revolution” 
(Weinert, 2005, p. 588).19 
                                                                                           
 
thorny historical period serves as an important complement to my thesis in the 
present pair of articles: I intentionally avoid discussing this period that came at 
the height of Einstein’s intellectual development, because my interest is in the 
grounding of the worldview that led Einstein to his great discoveries of 1905 and 
1915. No developments after 1915 are relevant to the present study, except later 
reports from Einstein and others regarding his early development. Similarly, 
Ryckman pays no attention to Einstein’s early development, never even 
addressing the question of the philosophical grounding of his worldview. Yet his 
defense of the transcendental idealist (i.e., Kantian) grounding of relativity theory 
corroborates the feasibility of my central claim about Einstein’s worldview in this 
pair of articles. 
18 For a discussion of Cassirer’s debate with the positivists in their quarrel 
over Einstein’s attention, see Ryckman (2005, pp. 13-46). But the real heros in 
Ryckman’s account are Hermann Weyl, who used Husserl’s phenomenology as a 
grounding in a way comparable to Cassirer’s use of Kant (see Chap. 6, pp. 145-
176), and Arthur Eddington (see Chap. 8, pp. 218-234). 
19 My account here is brief and incomplete because my purpose is not to 
review the many twists and turns of Einstein’s mature development, but only to 
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The mature Einstein named Spinoza as his favorite philosopher, once 
replying to the question “Who are your favorite philosophers?” by saying: “I 
enjoy reading the works of Schopenhauer and Kant and Plato. But my 
favorite of all is Spinoza” (Bucky & Weakland, 1992, p. 112). This was 
certainly not always true of Einstein, if we are to believe Talmey’s above-
quoted report that at age 13 “Kant became Albert’s favorite philosopher.”20 
As an adult, Einstein often expressed an explicit preference for Hume over 
Kant (see e.g., Einstein, 1998, pp. 165, 269, 575). In a 1915 letter to Moritz 
Schlick, Einstein says he studied Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature “avidly 
and with admiration shortly before discovering the theory of relativity” 
(Einstein, 1998, p. 165). (The editors date this reading of Hume to 1902—
Einstein, 1998, pp. 221f, 347f, German edition) Having just referred to 
“Kant and his successors,” along with Mach, Hume, and the neo-positivists, 
Einstein admits: “It is very possible that without these philosophical studies I 
would not have arrived at the solution” (Einstein, 1998, p. 165). He does not 
say which of Hume’s ideas influenced him or to what extent. Hume’s special 
role, therefore, might have had more to do with the timing of Einstein’s 
reading of the arch-skeptic’s work than with the closeness of Hume’s 
theories to his own. 
Complementing these other influences, Einstein continued reading and 
discussing Kant’s writings throughout his adulthood. For example, while 
living in Prague for 17 months in 1911-12, he joined “a group of young 
Jewish intellectuals [who] gathered weekly to discuss philosophy,” 
sometimes referred to “as ‘Kant Abende [Kant evenings],’ because Kant’s 
work was one of the main continuing subjects of discussion” (Overbye, 
2000, p. 203). Einstein joined the group just as it was “embarking on a two-
                                                                                           
 
assess the impact of his childhood love affair with Kant on the worldview we can 
see operating throughout his writings. The former task has already been carried 
out in numerous historical studies; most of these are largely irrelevant to the 
present study because they either ignore or at best underemphasize Kant’s role in 
Einstein’s development. For typical examples see Miller (1982) and Hentschel 
(1997). Hentschel and others have thoroughly documented Einstein’s shift from 
his early exposure to Kant through materialist and Machian phases to a brief 
attraction to the early logical empiricism of Schlick and Reichenbach and ending 
up with the rational realism of his later years. For a recent overview that gives 
more detailed attention to the various parties who were trying to “save Kant” from 
the implications of relativity theory, see Howard (forthcoming). The 
developmental issues discussed in these works are also irrelevant to our present 
concerns because Einstein himself remained mostly aloof from detailed debates 
such as that between the neo-Kantians and the logical empiricists. 
20 Also quoted in Brian (2005, pp. 8-9). 
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year study of Kant’s Prolegomena and the Critique of Pure Reason” 
(Overbye, 2000, pp. 203-204). Einstein obviously would have known in 
advance that this was the planned topic, so he must have had an ongoing 
interest in Kant even at this point. A few years later, in June of 1918, he 
wrote in a letter to Max Born that he had recently been “lying on the shore 
like a crocodile,” ignoring “the so-called world,” and reading books such as 
“Kant’s Prolegomena” (Einstein, 1998, p. 575). (By this time Einstein was 
probably also acquainted with Kant’s minor essays relating to various topics 
in physics and other sciences, because “[a] copy of Buek’s [1909] edition of 
Kant’s writings on natural philosophy is in Einstein’s library” (Einstein, 
1998, pp. 383f, German edition 21 ). Einstein says reading Prolegomena 
enabled him “to understand the enormous impact that has emanated and still 
is emanating from this fellow” (Einstein, 1998, p. 575). Offering Born his 
usual gloss on Kant, Einstein confesses his need to “tone down ‘a priori’ into 
‘conventional’ in order not to have to contradict myself” (Einstein, 1998, p. 
575). Although it was tempting to be “ensnared” by Kant, because his 
philosophy “is very nice reading,” it is still “not as fine as his predecessor 
Hume, who also had considerably more common sense” (Einstein, 1998, p. 
575). 22  The latter claim is impossible to assess without knowing what 
Einstein meant by “common sense.” It likely indicates that Einstein thought 
Hume led a more interesting life than Kant–a fact that has nothing to do with 
the veracity of their respective philosophical theories, nor with the question 
of which theory provides a more reliable grounding for the subsequent 
developments of empirical science. However, it does raise a crucial question 
that calls for an answer before we proceed any further: if Einstein’s 
worldview really is grounded in Kant’s philosophy, why was Einstein so 
reluctant to admit this influence and acknowledge the resonances that others 
have so clearly seen? 
 
4. Einstein’s Reluctance to Acknowledge Kant’s Influence 
 
Einstein’s tendency to downplay Kant’s influence in favor of Spinoza and 
other non-German philosophers may be due as much (if not more) to 
personal factors as to his own reflections on Kant’s philosophy. The Kant 
who so attracted young Einstein, as a German citizen during the heyday of 
                                               
 
21 Otto Buek’s edition of Immanuel Kants kleinere Schriften zur 
Naturphilosophie2 (Leipzig: Dürr’sche Buchhandlung, 1909), published as 
volumes 48-49 of Philosophische Bibliothek, is an exhaustive collection of Kant’s 
relevant essays on natural philosophy. 
22 Jammer (1999, pp. 42-52), discusses these and other influences. 
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that country’s pre-war idealism, would have become considerably less 
attractive the more disgusted Einstein grew with the German political scene. 
At age 15, having stayed in a Munich boarding school when his parents and 
sister moved to Milan in 1894, Einstein gave up his German citizenship 
(effective January 1896) to avoid fulfilling his otherwise mandatory military 
service, remaining stateless until he obtained Swiss citizenship five years 
later (Parker, 2003, pp. 32, 38-39). During his time alone in Munich, 
Einstein “immersed himself in the study of the philosopher, Immanuel Kant” 
(Parker, 2003, p. 33). Having already read Kant’s Universal Natural 
History and Theory of the Heavens (1755), Einstein “spent the most time 
on…Critique of Pure Reason” (Parker, 2003, p. 34). Given Kant’s 
innovative suggestions in the former book about the formation of the solar 
system, the nature of galaxies, and other speculations that later turned out to 
be confirmed by empirical evidence, and in light of the revolutionary 
Copernican hypothesis Kant proposes in the latter book, “it’s obvious that 
[Einstein] was already thinking seriously about” issues that later led him to 
propose “his theory of special relativity” (Parker, 2003, p. 34). When he 
arranged to join his parents in Milan six months later, “Einstein had become 
fascinated by philosophy after reading Kant,” so much so that “[h]e told his 
father he would like to teach philosophy” (Parker, 2003, p. 34)! Fortunately 
for the world of physics, “his practical-minded father” strongly disapproved 
of such a plan, pointing young Albert in the direction of engineering 
instead.23 For the next decade, after all at once giving up his home country, 
his love of Kant, and his dream of teaching philosophy, Einstein lived in 
obscurity, first as a university student and high school mathematics teacher, 
then (starting in 1902) as an employee of the Swiss patent office in Bern. 
After publishing five ground-breaking papers in 1905, Einstein 
skyrocketed to fame. His “sudden worldwide fame was unparalleled, 
especially for a physicist or mathematician…. From 1919 on he was without 
question the world’s most famous and celebrated scientist, the most loved 
and the most hated” (Brian, 1996, p. 104). Less than a decade after the 
publication of those five papers, in the political turmoil building up to World 
War I, 93 German academics signed a “Manifesto to the cultural world” 
(published on 4 October 1914) praising Goethe, Beethoven and Kant as key 
figures confirming Germany’s cultural supremacy (Robinson, 2005, p. 158). 
Einstein (now a Swiss citizen) was probably not even asked to sign;24 as an 
                                               
 
23 Brian (1996, pp. 6-7) reports these events in much the same way. 
24 Robinson (2005) claims he was not; Overbye (2000, pp. 272-274), claims he 
was. 
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open opponent of the war, he signed a less publicized “countermanifesto” 
entitled “Appeal to Europeans” (Robinson, 2005, p. 158). As Einstein’s 
pacifism became more public and Germany’s tendency toward anti-Semitism 
increased, he “became the target of anti-Semitic Germans exasperated by his 
worldwide fame”; for example, the renowned physicist, Philipp Lenard, 
claimed “the Jew…lacks understanding for the truth… Science, like every 
other human product, is racial and conditioned by blood” (Brian, 1996, p. 
105). 
By “the 1920s and early 30s,” both Einstein and his theories were widely 
rejected by German academia as “the work of ‘Jewish science’” (Robinson, 
2005, p. 158). 25  By contrast, Spinoza was Jewish and, like Einstein, 
experienced political persecution–though Spinoza’s was at the hands of his 
fellow Jews, not an expression of anti-Semitism. Similarly noting the 
common Jewishness of Spinoza and Einstein, von Weizsäcker reports 
Einstein “never forgave Germany for” engaging in “the personal attacks” 
against him (Weizsäcker, 1979, pp. 167-168). In a context where some 
German colleagues and students would “greet him with obscenities,” send 
death threats, and even “offered a reward to anyone who killed Einstein the 
pacifist” (Brian, 1996, p. 105), we should not be surprised that the mature 
Einstein was reluctant to admit how deeply his worldview was grounded in 
the ideas of a German philosopher, Kant. 
In his old age, Einstein refused to admit any influence from Kant, though 
he acknowledged that his autobiography, being a work written from the 
perspective of old age, might not accurately reflect how his experiences 
seemed when they unfolded (Einstein, 1949/1969, p. 9). (When he says 
Hume’s philosophy highlights the perspectival/relativistic nature of space 
better than Kant’s (Einstein, 1949/1969, p. 13) his memory seems to have 
been as imprecise as his interpretations of Hume and Kant on that issue. Or, 
Einstein might have had in mind his conviction that geometry must have “an 
analytical foundation” (Einstein, 1998, p. 618)–a view he did share with 
Hume but not with Kant.) In a 1949 reply to his critics, with the end of 
World War II fresh in everyone’s memory, he writes: 
 
I did not grow up in the Kantian tradition, but came to understand the truly valuable 
[insight] which is to be found in his doctrine, alongside of errors which today are 
quite obvious, only quite late. It is contained in the sentence: “The real is not given 
to us, but put to us (aufgegeben) (by way of a riddle).” This obviously means: There 
                                               
 
25  This trend culminated in 1931 with the publication of a book entitled 
Hundert Autoren gegen Einstein, composed of 28 short essays by members of the 
“anti-relativist” movement. For a discussion of this work, see Goenner (1993, pp. 
248-273). 
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is such a thing as a conceptual construction for the grasping of the inter-personal, 
the authority of which lies purely in its validation. This conceptual construction 
refers precisely to the “real” (by definition), and every further question concerning 
the “nature of the real” appears empty. (Einstein, 1949/1969, p. 680).  
 
For Einstein, “the Kantian tradition” was a complex debate between the 
Marburg neo-Kantianism of Cassirer and the logical empiricism of Schlick, 
Reichenbach, etc.; this is the Kant he came to know only during his adult 
life; the insight that carries with it an appeal to Kant’s “obvious” errors 
refers to the need both parties in this debate saw to revise Kant’s strict 
position on the synthetic a priori. What remains “valuable,” even after 
correcting the “error,” is Kant’s awareness that science must rely on 
subjectively constructed concepts that define what counts as real. The quoted 
paragraph might seem like a negative comment about Kant, but it is actually 
quite affirmative, being one of the few places where the mature Einstein 
openly acknowledges that his own “conventionalism” had its roots in Kant–a 
point we shall elaborate in §2 of Part II. 
Having demonstrated that a Kantian grounding for Einstein’s worldview 
is plausible, given that he fully immersed himself in Kant’s philosophy at a 
young age, and having offered a possible explanation for Einstein’s 
reluctance to admit this grounding, the chief remaining task is to examine 
more closely the key issue of why Einstein rejected Kant’s position on the 
status of synthetic a priori principles in science. This will be the main focus 
of Part II in this series of articles. It will, in turn, prepare us to examine the 
deep resonances between Kant’s and Einstein’s approach to religion, as a 
quasi-mystical expression of the absolute mystery of the universe. For 
together with science, the nature of one’s religious commitments constitutes 
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